Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the National Labor Relations Act by Goad, Kara
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student
Research Papers Cornell Law Student Papers
5-2017
Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker
Labor Unions Under the National Labor Relations
Act
Kara Goad
Cornell Law School, klg227@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cornell Law Student Papers at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Research Papers by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goad, Kara, "Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the National Labor Relations Act" (2017). Cornell
Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Research Papers. 14.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp/14
1 
 
 
Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the National Labor 
Relations Act 
Introduction 
On September 9, 2016, an estimated 24,000 inmates in at least 29 prisons across the 
United States refused to work as part of a coordinated labor strike.1  Though the exact number of 
participants is difficult to confirm, a member of the committee that helped organize the strike 
states that this was the largest prison strike in U.S. history.2  An inmate in a South Carolina 
prison estimated that 350 of the 1,500 inmates there participated in the strike, refusing to appear 
for work assignments in an on-site, privately owned furniture factory and as the prison’s 
landscapers, janitors, and cooks.3  A Michigan Department of Corrections spokesperson said that 
inmates at one Michigan facility did not report for kitchen work, forcing correctional officers to 
provide food.4  Four hundred inmates at that facility also marched peacefully in the yard before 
the prison went on lockdown.5  In Alabama, some corrections officers joined in the strike to 
protest overcrowded and understaffed prisons.6  The Incarcerated Workers Organizing 
                                                          
1 Support Prisoner Resistance! Sept 9th 2016 Shakes History, IWW INCARCERATED WORKERS 
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/09/14/support-
prisoner-resistance-sept-9th-2016-shakes-history/. 
2 Alice Speri, The Largest Prison Strike in U.S. History Enters Its Second Week, THE INTERCEPT 
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/16/the-largest-prison-strike-in-u-s-history-
enters-its-second-week/. 
3 E. Tammy Kim, A National Strike Against “Prison Slavery,” THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-national-strike-against-prison-slavery. 
4 Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Why Prisoners Across the Country Have Gone on Strike, MOTHER 
JONES (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/prison-strike-
inmate-labor-work. 
5 Id. 
6 Beth Schwartzapfel, A Primer on the Nationwide Prisoners’ Strike, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Sept. 27, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/27/a-primer-on-the-
nationwide-prisoners-strike#.odhyw56lJ. 
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Committee (“IWOC”), part of the Industrial Workers of the World labor union, organized the 
strike through mailings and conference calls to inmates and their families and through 
partnerships with lawyers and activists.7  Through the strike, the inmates and organizers aimed to 
call attention to a range of grievances, including unfair pay for inmate work and inhumane prison 
conditions.8   
Casting light on and adding gravity to these issues is the IWOC’s rallying call for the 
strike: “This is a Call to Action Against Slavery in America.”9  The IWOC is one of many voices 
in the growing discussion of prison labor as a form of modern-day slavery in the United States.10  
Inmate labor at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, also known as Angola, provides a stark example 
of what gives rise to these discussions.  Located on what was once a slave plantation, Angola is 
now home to a program under which inmates work in the same plantation fields for as little as 
two cents per hour.11  The prison can force the inmates to work after they are cleared by a doctor, 
and it is not required to compensate them.12  Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes 
this program when it provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
                                                          
7 Kim, supra note 3. 
8 See Schwartzapfel, supra note 6. 
9 Announcement of Nationally Coordinated Prisoner Workstoppage for Sept 9, 2016, IWW 
INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/04/01/announcement-of-nationally-coordinated-prisoner-
workstoppage-for-sept-9-2016/. 
10 See Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/; Carimah 
Townes, ‘It’s Just Dressed Up Slavery’: America’s Shadow Workforce Rises Up Against Prison 
Labor, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 9, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/its-just-dressed-up-slavery-
america-s-shadow-workforce-rises-up-against-prison-labor-e8ee1b5a8738#.1q61uxtp1; Nicky 
Woolf, Inside America’s Biggest Prison Strike: ‘The 13th Amendment Didn’t End Slavery, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/22/inside-us-prison-
strike-labor-protest; 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016). 
11 Benns, supra note 10. 
12 Id. 
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United States.”13  Programs like those at Angola also exist because legislatures and courts have 
prevented traditional labor and employment law rights and protections from applying to 
incarcerated workers.14   
This Note seeks to demonstrate that labor law can provide one avenue for remedying 
some of the grievances of incarcerated workers.15  In particular, this Note argues that the 
National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or “the Board”) August 2016 decision regarding the 
right of graduate research assistants to unionize in Columbia University creates a particularly 
relevant opening for arguing that incarcerated workers are also able to unionize under the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”).  Part I of this Note provides background 
information on the prison system in the United States and the ways in which inmate labor occurs 
within it, as well as on the NLRA and the NLRB.  Part II lays the groundwork for the application 
of Columbia University to the situation of incarcerated workers by providing an overview of 
decisions regarding the status of incarcerated workers under labor and employment statutes 
before Columbia University and of the Board’s decision in Columbia University.  Part III 
contrasts the Board’s reasoning in Columbia University with these earlier decisions and argues 
that the Board has set itself up to disagree with their reasoning and in fact has interpreted the Act 
such that incarcerated workers should be protected under it.  Part III also raises and addresses a 
number of potential obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization and contends that none of 
these obstacles must necessarily prevent their unionization.  Though Part III also reveals that the 
                                                          
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id.  
14 See Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated Workers, 52 
IDAHO L. REV. 953, 955 (2016). 
15 The proposals in this Note are proposals for changes that will occur within the United States’ 
existing incarceration system.  However, they could also operate as part of movements that call 
for the abolition of this system itself.  See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 103–04 
(2003).   
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number of incarcerated workers who would currently fall under the Act’s protection is somewhat 
limited, this Note argues that in light of the ways in which prison labor is a form of modern-day 
slavery, the Board, courts, and the public should seize this opportunity to establish a foundation 
for incarcerated worker unionization.16   
I. Background 
A. The U.S. Prison System 
The structure of the prison system in the United States, and how inmate labor occurs 
within it, will affect the application of the NLRB’s decision in Columbia University to 
incarcerated worker unionization, as discussed in greater detail in Part III.  In the United States, 
federal prisons hold individuals charged or convicted with federal crimes.17  Each state also has 
its own prison system, and municipalities and counties typically operate the country’s jails.18  In 
2014, federal prisons held 210,567 individuals, and state prisons held 1,350,958 individuals.19  
Local jails held an additional 744,600 individuals.20   
At both the federal and state level, prisons are operated by either the government or 
private corporations.21  In 2014, government-operated (or “public”) federal prisons held 169,500 
individuals, and privately-operated federal prisons and community correction centers22 held 
                                                          
16 For another argument in favor of supporting incarcerated worker unionization even on a 
relatively small scale, see Fink, supra note 14, at 956. 
17 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFAIRS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING PRISON SYSTEMS 8 (2012). 
18 Id. at 9.   
19 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF 
STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, DECEMBER 31, 1978-2014 (2015). 
20 DANIELLE KAEBLE, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2014 2 (2016). 
21 See id. at 22. 
22 More commonly known as “halfway houses,” these centers are operated by private companies 
under contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons.  Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates to the 
Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 1 n.1 (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Yates 
Memorandum]. 
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40,000 individuals.23  At the state level, government-operated state prisons held 1,172,600 
individuals, and privately-operated state prisons held 91,200 individuals in 2014.24  In the United 
States, the two largest private prison corporations are CoreCivic (formerly known as Corrections 
Corporation of America) and The GEO Group.25  These corporations design, construct, expand, 
and manage the prisons they operate.26  Both CoreCivic and The GEO Group operate prisons 
under contracts with the federal government and with state governments.27   
On August 18, 2016, then-U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates sent a memo to 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons directing the Bureau to either decline to renew or substantially 
reduce the scope of its contracts with private prison corporations as the contracts expired.28  This 
move by the federal government away from contracting with private prison corporations was a 
result of reports showing that private prisons do not provide the same level of correctional 
services, programs, resources, safety, or security that public prisons provide.29  However, on 
February 23, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum reversing the Obama-
                                                          
23 KAEBLE, supra note 20, at 22. 
24 Id. 
25 Chico Harlan, “The Private Prison Industry Was Crashing – Until Donald Trump’s Victory,” 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/10/the-private-prison-industry-was-
crashing-until-donald-trumps-victory/?utm_term=.de35a7a79888. 
26 See Who We Are, CCA, http://www.cca.com/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).    
27 Management & Operations, THE GEO GROUP, INC., 
http://www.geogroup.com/Management_and_Operations (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); See CCA’s 
Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, CCA, http://www.cca.com/locations (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2017). 
28 Yates Memorandum, supra note 22, at 2. 
29 Id. at 1–2. 
6 
 
era policy.30  In the memo, Attorney General Sessions directed the Bureau to return to its 
previous, unrestricted approach to contracting with private prisons.31 
B. Prison Labor in the United States 
The latest census of federal and state prisons reports that in 2005, 88% of these facilities 
offered inmate work programs.32  More than half (54%) of the inmates at facilities offering work 
programs had work assignments.33  At the time of the census, a much higher percentage of public 
facilities (97%) offered work assignments to inmates than did private facilities (56%).34  The 
distinction between federal and state facility offerings was less drastic—work assignments were 
available to inmates in 98% of federal facilities and 87% of state facilities.35  A 2014 article 
provides more recent figures and estimates that 870,000 inmates worked full time in 2014.36  
Inmates in public federal prisons are required to work if they are medically able,37 and the same 
is also true for some public state prisons.38   
Prison work programs consist of different jobs and come in different organizational 
systems.  In the most common “state account” system, the government department that operates 
                                                          
30 See Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Will Again Use Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Feb. 
23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-will-
again-use-private-prisons/2017/02/23/da395d02-fa0e-11e6-be05-
1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.691e37802931. 
31 See id. 
32 JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005 5 (2008).  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Beth Schwartzapfel, Modern-Day Slavery in America’s Prison Workforce, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, May 28, 2014, http://prospect.org/article/great-american-chain-gang.   
37 Work Programs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/work_programs.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
38 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-26. 
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the prison wholly manages the work program, sells the product, and receives the revenue.39  In 
the case of public federal prisons, this system takes the form of the wholly owned government 
corporation, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., also known as UNICOR.40  UNICOR operates 110 
factories at 79 federal prisons.41  UNICOR’s incarcerated workers take calls at call centers, 
repair vehicles, and make furniture, among many other things.42  These workers receive 
approximately $0.04 of each $1.00 in UNICOR sales revenue.43  Every state also has its own 
UNICOR-like prison industry program,44 though incarcerated workers in some of these programs 
do not receive any payment.45 
Under a “contract” system, a private firm, rather than the government, operates the work 
program pursuant to a contract with the prison.46  Workers in this type of system remain in the 
prison’s custody while they work.47  Work release programs, in which inmates are permitted to 
work for pay in the community during the day,48 also fall under the umbrella of contract systems.  
                                                          
39 See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic 
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 869–70 (2008).   
40 See Program Details, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/unicor_about.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).  
41 Caitlin Seandel, Prison Labor: Three Strikes and You’re Hired, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ELLA’S VOICE (June 27, 2013), http://ellabakercenter.org/blog/2013/06/prison-labor-is-
the-new-slave-labor. 
42 See UNICOR Schedule of Products and Services, UNICOR, 
https://www.unicor.gov/SOPalphalist.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
43 Program Details, supra note 40. 
44 Sarah Shemkus, Beyond Cheap Labor: Can Prison Work Programs Benefit Inmates?, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2015/dec/09/prison-work-program-ohsa-whole-foodsp-inmate-labor-incarceration; see, 
e.g., About CALPIA, STATE OF CAL. PRISON INDUS. AUTH., 
http://www.calpia.ca.gov/About_PIA/AboutPIA.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
45 See Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of 
Working Inmates, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 694 (2015) (noting that the Georgia 
Department of Corrections does not pay incarcerated workers). 
46 See Zatz, supra note 39, at 870. 
47 See Fink, supra note 14, at 958. 
48 See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2012), 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/pages/files/6313/6586/2224/WorkRelease.pdf.  
8 
 
Though the federal government does not use a contract labor system in any of its prisons, public 
state prisons have work programs operating under this system.  According to a 1995 Department 
of Justice report, Escod Industries, a private corporation, operates a manufacturing plant at Evans 
Correctional Facility, a public South Carolina prison.49  Incarcerated workers there assemble 
electronic cables that Escod has sold to companies like IBM.50  At Perry Correctional Institute, 
another public South Carolina prison, incarcerated workers assemble wooden furniture for an on-
site private company.51   
Though it is not clear from the limited information that CoreCivic and The GEO Group 
provide, these private prison corporations could operate their work programs under either a state 
account-like system or a contract system.  CoreCivic states that work assignments for its inmates 
can include building or manufacturing goods.52  The GEO Group notes only that it offers 
vocational programming that includes on-the-job training and partnerships with local 
employers.53  Though neither corporation provides information on incarcerated worker salaries, 
one source estimates that they receive as little as $0.17 per hour for a maximum of six hours per 
day, which totals $20.00 per month.54  At the highest-paying private prison in Tennessee, run by 
CoreCivic, the same source reports that incarcerated workers receive $0.50 per hour for highly-
skilled positions.55 
                                                          
49 GEORGE E. SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICA’S PRISONS: JOINT VENTURES 
WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 5 (1995). 
50 Id.  
51 Kim, supra note 3. 
52 Work Assignments, CCA, http://www.cca.com/inmate-services/inmate-reentry-
preparation/work-assignments (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). 
53 In-Custody Programs, THE GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.com/In-
Custody_Evidtence_Based_Programs (last visited Jan 18, 2017). 
54 Vicky Peláez, The Prison Industry in the United States: New Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL 
RESEARCH, Aug. 28, 2016, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-
states-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289. 
55 Id. 
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In addition to working under these two systems, it is common for incarcerated workers to 
contribute to the prison’s day-to-day operations.56  In public federal prisons, inmates work in 
food service and as orderlies, plumbers, painters, and groundskeepers.57  These workers receive 
$0.12 to $0.40 per hour.58  Public state prisons also use incarcerated workers to maintain day-to-
day facility operations and maintenance.59  Additionally, CoreCivic states that its incarcerated 
workers serve as custodial assistants or food service attendants.60 
Since the early 1900s, when labor unions and small businesses concerned with unfair 
competition from goods produced by incarcerated workers put pressure on the federal 
government, Congress has restricted the sale of these goods in interstate commerce.61  In 1935, 
Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly transport 
prison-made goods into a state that prohibited their sale.62  Congress then amended the Ashurst-
Sumners Act in 1940 to make the interstate transportation and sale of prison-made goods a 
federal crime regardless of state laws.63  However, this restriction does not apply to goods 
manufactured for use by the federal government, the District of Columbia, state governments, or 
political subdivisions of a state or non-profit organization.64  As a result of the Ashurst-Sumners 
                                                          
56 See Zatz, supra note 39, at 870. 
57 Work Programs, supra note 37.  
58 Id.   
59 See, e.g., HAWAII DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, POLICY NO. CORR. 14.02, INMATE WORK 
PROGRAM/COMPENSATION (2010).   
60 Work Assignments, supra note 52. 
61 See Fink, supra note 14, at 958. 
62 Fulcher, supra note 45, at 689. 
63 Id. 
64 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1761(b). 
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Act and its exceptions, UNICOR sell its products only to the federal government,65 and state 
prison industry programs sell only to state and local governments.66 
Congress created an additional exception to the Ashurst-Sumners Act when it created the 
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (“PIE”) in 1979.67  The program exempts 
certified state and local departments of corrections from the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s restrictions, 
permitting them to sell goods produced by incarcerated workers in the open market.68  To 
become certified under the program, the state or local department of corrections must 
demonstrate that it meets the requirements set out in the Mandatory Criteria for Program 
Participation.69  As of September 30, 2016, 47 jurisdictions were PIE-certified, and a total of 
5,435 inmates worked in programs in these jurisdictions.70  These programs involve partnerships 
with private corporations, and these corporations either serve as customers of the departments of 
correction or as direct employers of incarcerated workers.71  PIE-certified programs must pay 
wages “at a rate not less than that paid for work of a similar nature in the locality in which the 
work is performed.”72  However, corrections departments are free to take deductions from the 
wages of incarcerated workers for taxes, room and board, family support, and victims’ 
                                                          
65 Customers and Private Sector FAQs, UNICOR, 
https://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_Market_Share.aspx#1 (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
66 See Fink, supra note 14, at 958. 
67 See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PRISON 
INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 1 (2004). 
68 See id. 
69 Id.  See id. at 3 for these requirements. 
70 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 
CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING CENTER LISTING, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 1 (2016), available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-
content/uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-Certification-Listing-Report.pdf.   
71 See id. at 3–4 (listing private corporations as participating in projects under either a 
“customer” or “employer” model). 
72 Id. at 3. 
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compensation, and these deductions can total up to 80% of a worker’s gross wages.73  For the 
quarter ending September 30, 2016, PIE-certified programs resulted in gross wages of 
$11,104,906, but after deductions, net wages to incarcerated workers were only $4,780,857.74  
Thus, each incarcerated worker in a PIE-certified program made approximately $98.00 each 
month in 2016.   
C. The National Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board 
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to eliminate obstructions to 
the free flow of commerce, including industrial strife and unequal bargaining power between 
employers and employees, by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining 
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”75  To achieve this end, the Act 
forbids employers from interfering with, restraining, or discharging individuals engaged in 
protected activities, which include self-organization, collective bargaining, and engaging in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.76  
These protections only apply to individuals who fall within the statute’s definition of 
                                                          
73 Id.  
74 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 
QUARTERLY REPORT, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 3 (2016), 
available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-Statistical-Data-
Report.pdf. 
75 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
76 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–58. 
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employee.”77  Further, they only apply to employees who work for employers that are covered 
by the Act, a category that excludes the federal and state governments.78   
The NLRA also establishes the National Labor Relations Board, which consists of five 
members that are appointed by the President for five-year terms.79  The Board primarily acts as a 
quasi-judicial body,80 deciding cases regarding unfair labor practices under the Act.81  However, 
the Board also oversees the union election process, which occurs when employees submit a 
petition to the Board to certify or decertify a union as their bargaining representative.82  
Additionally, the Board fills gaps in the NLRA by engaging in rulemaking or by announcing 
policies and rules in the matters it adjudicates.83  The Board relies almost exclusively on 
adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to establish rules and policies.84  Notably, the doctrine of 
stare decisis, which refers to courts’ practice of adhering to a previous decision when that 
                                                          
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations . . . .” (emphasis added)).  The statute defines “employee” as “any 
employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the 
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual 
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway 
Labor Act . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.”  29 U.S.C. § 
152(3).   
78 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (defining “employer” as “any person acting as an agent of an 
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State or political subdivision 
thereof”). 
79 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). 
80 The Board, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board 
(last visited March 4, 2017). 
81 See Decide Cases, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-
do/decide-cases (last visited March 4, 2017). 
82 See Conduct Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-
do/conduct-elections (last visited March 5, 2017). 
83 See TANJA L. THOMPSON & R. BRADLEY MOKROS, AS THE PENDULUM SWINGS: THE ROLE OF 
PRECEDENT IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISIONS 1 (2009). 
84 See Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. 
Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1470, 1471 (2015).  
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decision addresses the issue before the court,85 does not strictly apply to the Board’s adjudicatory 
process.86  However, circuit courts have held that “the Board may not depart . . . from its usual 
rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained result in a single case.”87  In addition, the 
Board does refer to its prior decisions as “precedent,”88 and it considers the facts and reasoning 
of these decisions when it addresses similar situations.89 
II. Incarcerated Workers Then, Columbia University Now 
A. Incarcerated Workers as Employees before Columbia University 
Neither the NLRB nor a federal court has specifically considered whether incarcerated 
workers are employees under the NLRA.90  However, federal courts have addressed whether 
incarcerated workers in work release programs were properly included in a collective bargaining 
unit with other employees under the NLRA.91  These courts found that incarcerated workers on 
work release could be included in bargaining units alongside non-incarcerated employees under 
                                                          
85 See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
86 See THOMPSON & MOKROS, supra note 83, at 1 (citing NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 
350 (7th Cir. 1971) (“The doctrine of stare decisis does not require that the Board’s policies and 
standards be unchangeable since it must meet changing conditions by corresponding changes in 
policies and standards.”)) 
87 NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(citing Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (1964)). 
88 See Boston Medical Center Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999) (“The Petitioner, mindful of 
the Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s Hospital precedent, requests that the Board overrule that 
precedent.”).  
89 See id. at 159. 
90 See Fink, supra note 14 at 966. 
91 See Speedtrack Prods. Grp., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1278–82 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Rosslyn Concrete Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 713 F.2d 61, 63–64 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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the Act.92  These holdings would be consistent with including incarcerated workers in general as 
employees under the NLRA.93 
Federal courts have also addressed whether incarcerated workers are employees under 
two other federal labor and employment statutes—the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).94  The definition of “employee” in these 
two statutes is very similar to that in the NLRA;95 thus, looking to judicial opinions regarding 
whether incarcerated workers meet the definition of “employee” under FLSA and Title VII is 
useful for considering their status as employees under the NLRA.   
In his article on the economic dimensions of employment relationships, Noah D. Zatz 
categorizes the ways in which courts have evaluated whether incarcerated workers are protected 
under FLSA and Title VII.96  The vast majority of these courts have concluded that incarcerated 
worker claims for protection under these statutes fail.97  Zatz explains that this conclusion is a 
result of courts adopting an “exclusive market” approach to determining what constitutes 
employment.98  Under this approach, courts find that incarcerated workers and the institutions 
                                                          
92 See Rosslyn Concrete, 713 F.2d at 64; cf. Speedtrack Prods., 114 F.3d at 1282 (holding that 
the NLRB’s decision that the work release inmates did not share a community of interest with 
other unit employees and thus could not be part of the bargaining unit was unreasonable).   
93 See Fink, supra note 14, at 996. 
94 See Zatz, supra note 39, at n.101–02 (collecting cases). 
95 FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”  29 U.S.C. § 
203(e)(1).  Title VII also defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer.”  42 
U.S.C § 2000e(f).  The NLRA states that “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee.”  
29 U.S.C. § 152(3).   
96 See id.at 884–896. 
97 Compare id. at n.101–02 (collecting over forty-five cases in which courts found no 
employment relationship), with id. at n.103 (collecting seven cases in which courts found that 
there could be an employment relationship at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage).   
98 See id. at 882. 
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for which they work are in nonmarket or noneconomic relationships, and thus they are not 
employees and employers in an employment relationship.99 
Many of these courts find that the relationship between incarcerated workers and the 
institutions for which they work is nonmarket or noneconomic by conflating economic 
relationships with contract relationships.100  As Zatz explains, this type of reasoning has three 
components—there is no free contract when prison labor is involuntary, there is no contract 
when there is no exchange between the parties, and whatever exchange exists between the parties 
fails to take the form of a discrete bargain.101  The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Morgan v. 
MacDonald illustrates the first two of these components.  There, the court states: 
Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.461, all inmates are required to work 
or receive training for 40 hours each week.  Thus, Morgan was in no 
sense free to bargain with would-be employers for the sale of his 
labor; his work at the prison was merely an incident of his 
incarceration.  Morgan and the prison didn't contract with one 
another for mutual economic gain, as would be the case in a true 
employment relationship; their affiliation was “penological, not 
pecuniary.”  Because the economic reality of Morgan's work at the 
prison clearly indicates that his labor “belonged to the institution,” 
he cannot be deemed an employee under the FLSA.102 
 
The Fourth Circuit illustrates the third component when it notes in Harker v. State Use Industries 
that the parties “do not deal at arms’ length.”103  Thus, as Zatz explains, they do not encounter 
each other as strangers who engage in a discreet bargain.104  Key to both of these decisions is 
that the reasoning of the courts leads to the conclusion that the relationship between incarcerated 
                                                          
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 885; see also Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
“[p]risoners are essentially taken out of the national economy upon incarceration.  When they are 
assigned work within the prison for purposes of training and rehabilitation, they have not 
contracted with the government to become its employees”). 
101 See Zatz, supra note 39, at 885. 
102 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 
103 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993). 
104 See Zatz, supra note 39, at 891–92. 
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workers and the institution for which they work is a noneconomic relationship.  Then, under the 
exclusive market approach, they are also not in an employment relationship. 
Other courts do not focus on whether the relationship is a market or economic one before 
finding that an incarcerated worker is not an employee under FLSA or Title VII.  Instead, they 
focus on the presence of other relationships between the two parties and find that these other 
relationships preclude the existence of an employment one.  For example, in Williams v. Meese, 
the Tenth Circuit held that an incarcerated worker was not an employee under Title VII or the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act because: 
[Plaintiff’s] relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore, 
with the defendants, arises out of his status as an inmate, not an 
employee.  Although his relationship with defendants may contain 
some elements commonly present in an employment relationship, it 
arises “from [plaintiff’s] having been convicted and sentenced to 
imprisonment in the [defendants’] correctional institution.  The 
primary purpose of their association [is] incarceration, not 
employment.”105 
 
If the NLRB were to use this reasoning or reasoning based in contract theory to evaluate 
incarcerated worker claims for protection under the NLRA, these claims would fail because both 
lines of reasoning lead to the conclusion that incarcerated workers are not statutory employees. 
B. The NLRB’s Decision in Columbia University 
In its August 2016 Columbia University decision, the NLRB found that student teaching 
assistants are employees under the NLRA.106  In doing so, it overturned Brown University, a 
2004 Board decision holding that student teaching assistants were not employees under the 
NLRA because they “are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic, 
                                                          
105 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Prisoner Not Protected From Racial Job Bias, 2 
Empl. Proc. Guide (CCH) ¶ 6865, at 7009 (Apr. 18, 1986)). 
106 See N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012 at *1. 
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relationship with their university.”107  The Columbia University Board said regarding this 
reasoning: 
The fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame 
the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the existence of an 
employment relationship, but rather on whether some other 
relationship between the employee and the employer is the primary 
one—a standard neither derived from the statutory text of Section 
2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.108 
 
According to this decision, as long as there is an employment relationship, the existence of some 
other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent an individual from being protected as 
an employee.109  Further, the Columbia University Board notes:  
The Board and the courts have repeatedly made clear that the extent 
of any required “economic” dimension to an employment 
relationship is the payment of tangible compensation.  Even when 
such an economic component may seem comparatively slight, 
relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker and 
employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the 
employer’s control, suffices to establish an employment relationship 
for purposes of the Act.110 
 
The Board then explains that multiple relationships between employers and employees can 
coexist because the Act permits the Board to define the scope of the mandatory bargaining 
over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment that will occur between 
employers and employees.111  Thus, because employees and employers must bargain only 
about subjects related to their employment relationship, this bargaining need not implicate 
their other relationships.   
                                                          
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 5. 
109 See id. at 1. 
110 Id. at 5. 
111 See id. at 6.   
18 
 
The Columbia University decision builds upon similar reasoning by the Board in Boston 
Medical Center Corp.  In that decision, the Board overruled an earlier finding that interns and 
residents in hospitals were not employees under the NLRA because they were primarily serving 
as students rather than employees.112  The Boston Medical Center Corp. Board said of that 
reasoning, “residents and fellows fall within the broad definition of ‘employee’ under Section 
2(3), notwithstanding that a purpose of their being at a hospital may also be, in part, 
educational.”113 
III. Incarcerated Workers as Employees Under the NLRA After Columbia 
University: Application and Obstacles 
A. Applying Columbia University 
The Board’s language in Boston Medical Center and Columbia University contrasts 
markedly with the earlier reasoning regarding incarcerated workers under labor and employment 
statutes described in Part II of this Note.  Both Board decisions emphasize that the relationship 
between an employee and an employer need not be primarily one of employment.  Indeed, the 
Columbia University Board declares that it is a fundamental error to adopt this approach when 
determining statutory coverage.114  Instead, the Board emphasizes that the focus should be on 
whether an employment relationship exists, regardless of whether it exists alongside other 
relationships.  This approach forecloses the line of reasoning that the court took in Williams v. 
Meese to find that incarcerated workers were not employees.  Further, the Board notes that it has 
“repeatedly made clear” that the only economic dimension necessary for an employment 
relationship is the payment of tangible compensation and that an employment relationship 
                                                          
112 See Boston Medical Center Corp., supra note 88, at 152.  
113 Id. at 160.a 
114 N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012 at *5. 
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requires only this payment and employer control over the employee.115  This minimal 
requirement for the economic component of employment relationships does away with the 
extensive work that courts have done to find that incarcerated workers are in noneconomic 
relationships with their employer institutions because the relationships lack aspects of contract 
ones.   
This comparison shows that the Board has set itself up to disagree with the reasoning 
described in Part II that finds that incarcerated workers are not in employment relationships with 
the institutions in which they work.  Moreover, the Board’s established approach to determining 
if an employment relationship is present—looking to the presence of employer control and 
payment of compensation—accommodates the situations of many incarcerated workers.  As 
described in Part I, incarcerated workers are often paid for their labor, though the amount of pay 
is generally very small.  Further, courts have acknowledged that the relationship between these 
workers and their employers meets a control test.116  Taken together, this suggests that the Board 
has created an opening for finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA.117 
However, such a finding would not guarantee a clear path to unionizing for incarcerated 
workers.  The remainder of this Part discusses additional obstacles that will likely arise on this 
path and argues that none of these obstacles must necessarily prevent incarcerated worker 
unionization.  Further, it argues that the Board and courts should make a strong effort to 
                                                          
115 Id. 
116 See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “there is obviously 
enough control over the prisoner”); Zatz, supra note 39, at 872 (“Since the 1980s, however, 
courts have accepted that prison labor usually satisfies the relevant tests for control.”); cf. Carter 
v. Dutchess Cmty. College, 735 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim 
should not be dismissed on summary judgment because there was sufficient evidence of control). 
117 Notably, the General Counsel of the NLRB has already begun applying the reasoning in 
Columbia University outside the context of graduate teaching assistants.  See infra note 123. 
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overcome these obstacles in light of the ways that incarcerated worker labor is a form of modern-
day slavery. 
B. The Board’s Statutory and Discretionary Jurisdiction 
Because Congress passed the NLRA pursuant to its authority under the Commerce 
Clause,118 the NLRB’s statutory jurisdiction over a case depends on an employer’s activity in 
interstate commerce.119  The Board has established standards for asserting this statutory 
jurisdiction, which it describes as “very broad.”120  For example, retailers fall under this 
jurisdiction if they have a gross annual volume of business in interstate commerce of $500,000 or 
more.121  Though the Ashurst-Sumners Act prohibits the sale of goods made by incarcerated 
workers in many channels of interstate commerce, its exception for sales to federal and state 
governments very likely brings employers selling goods pursuant to this exception under the 
statutory jurisdiction of the Board.  Employers selling goods under the PIE program also very 
likely fall under the Board’s statutory jurisdiction because these goods are allowed to enter the 
open market.  These employers would only have to meet the Board’s minimal sales volume 
threshold.  Thus, the Board’s requirements for asserting its statutory jurisdiction will not likely 
prohibit it from considering whether incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA.   
Even when the NLRB has the statutory authority to consider and decide an issue, it may 
properly decline to assert its jurisdiction over the issue when exercising jurisdiction would not 
effectuate the policies underlying the NLRA—promoting stability in labor relations.122  The 
Board’s August 2015 decision in Northwestern University serves as a recent example of the 
                                                          
118 See 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
119 See Jurisdictional Standards, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951). 
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Board declining to exercise its jurisdiction over a case, and it shows that the Board’s reasons for 
declining to exercise its jurisdiction are not applicable to the situation of incarcerated workers.   
In Northwestern University, the Board explains that asserting jurisdiction over a 
representation petition and determining whether Northwestern University football players who 
receive grant-in-aid scholarships are employees under the NLRA would not effectuate the policy 
underlying the Act.123  The Board emphasizes that this decision not to assert jurisdiction is based 
on its findings regarding the nature of sports leagues.124  Because of the control that leagues 
exercise over the individual teams within them and the fact that the “overwhelming majority” of 
teams in the leagues are public schools, over which the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the 
Board found that exercising its jurisdiction in this case would not promote stability in labor 
relations.125  In particular, the Board points to the “symbiotic relationship” among the various 
                                                          
123 See Northwestern University, N.L.R.B. Case No. 13-RC-121359 at * 3 (2015).  On January 
31, 2017, the General Counsel of the NLRB sent a memorandum to the Board’s regional 
directors stating that Division I Football Bowl Subdivision scholarship players in private 
universities are employees under the NLRA.  Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General 
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 16 (Jan. 31, 2017).  
The General Counsel notes that the Board’s decision in Northwestern University does not 
preclude this conclusion because the reasoning underlying the Board’s decision not to assert 
jurisdiction over the players’ representation petition is not relevant to the issue of whether the 
players are employees under the NLRA.  See id. at 20.  Thus, regardless of whether the Board 
certifies the players’ petition to join a union, the players still have the right under the Act to 
engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.  See id. at 21–22. Though this 
memorandum does not carry the force of law, and though President Trump’s General Counsel 
appointment may not continue the policies set forth in it, the memorandum is notable because it 
relies on the Board’s reasoning in Boston Medical Center and Columbia University to find that 
the football players at issue in Northwestern University are employees under the NLRA.  See id. 
at 18.  Thus, it serves as support for the argument that the reasoning in Columbia University 
applies outside of the context of graduate teaching assistants.  Further, it illustrates that even if 
the Board declined to assert its discretionary jurisdiction over incarcerated workers, these 
workers could still be employees protected by the Act based on the reasoning in Columbia 
University.   
124 See id.   
125 Id.  Some have argued that the Board was incorrect in assuming that exercising jurisdiction 
would result in instability in this context and that the Board’s stability rationale as a whole cuts 
too broadly.  See Ben Levin, Guest Post: N.L.R.B. Missed Shot by Declining Jurisdiction in 
22 
 
football teams, leagues, and the NCAA, which oversees them both, and argues that because of 
this relationship, labor issues involving an individual team would also affect the leagues and the 
NCAA, creating instability.126  The Board says of this context, “there is no ‘product’ without 
direct interaction among the players and cooperation among the various teams.”127   
This is not the case in the context of incarcerated worker labor, however.  The products of 
incarcerated worker labor exist without direct interaction between workers in one prison and 
workers in another and without direct interaction between public and private prison systems as a 
whole.  Though it is true that many inmates work in public prisons over which the Board cannot 
exercise jurisdiction, the lack of direct interaction between these incarcerated workers and those 
in private prisons means that Board decisions regarding workers in private institutions will not 
create instability in the system as a whole.  Further, as illustrated by the Board’s exercise of 
jurisdiction in Columbia University, the fact that a type of labor exists in both a public and a 
private setting, as does graduate teaching assistant labor, cannot be the sole reason that the Board 
declines to exercise its jurisdiction.  Given the coordinated and widespread strikes described in 
the introduction to this Note, it is also clear that the policies of the Act—alleviating industrial 
strife and unequal bargaining power between employers and employees—would be furthered if 
the Board exercised jurisdiction over incarcerated workers.  Though these distinctions between 
Northwestern University and the situation of incarcerated workers do not ensure that the Board 
                                                          
Northwestern Football Case for “Stability,” ON LABOR (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://onlabor.org/2015/08/20/guest-post-n-l-r-b-missed-shot-by-declining-jurisdiction-in-
northwestern-football-case-for-stability/. 
126 See id.   
127 Id. 
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will exercise jurisdiction in a case involving these workers, they do show that the issue of 
exercising jurisdiction should not necessarily prevent incarcerated worker unionization.   
C. Employers in the Prison System 
A Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would not 
grant protection to all prison labor organizations because not all incarcerated workers have 
employers that are covered by the Act.  Some employers of incarcerated workers are not covered 
by the Act because it excludes federal and state governments from the employer category.  As 
described in Part I, many incarcerated workers contribute to day-to-day prison operations in 
public institutions or work for government-owned corporations like UNICOR, over which the 
Board has no jurisdiction.128  Other employers are likely not covered by the Act because they do 
not meet the interstate commerce requirements for the Board’s statutory jurisdiction.  This is 
likely the case for the employment relationship between private institutions and incarcerated 
workers contributing to prison operations for them.  However, approximately 130,000 inmates 
currently live in federal and state private prisons, and though the structures of the labor systems 
under which they work are not clear, some of these inmates manufacture goods for the private 
prison or local employers.129  A Board finding that these incarcerated workers are employees 
under, and thus protected by, the NLRA would move these workers one step further from the 
forms of modern-day slavery under which they currently work.  The same could also be true for 
                                                          
128 For an argument that government-owned prison industry corporations should not be excluded 
from NLRA coverage because they are proprietary enterprises indistinguishable from their 
private-sector counterparts, see Fink, supra note 14, at 967 n.102. 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
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the unknown number of inmates who work for private corporations inside public prisons, like 
those at Perry Correctional Institute in South Carolina.    
Because a Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would 
primarily affect workers in private prisons, it is important to overcome the idea that these private 
prisons are not employers under the Act because they are “political subdivision[s]” of a state or 
federal government, a type of employer not covered by the Act.130  In N.L.R.B. v. National Gas 
Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that entities are political 
subdivisions of a state if they are “either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute 
departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who 
are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.”131  Private prison corporations are 
incorporated by private individuals rather than the state132 and their Boards are not elected or 
appointed by, and thus are not responsible to, public officials or the general electorate.  Thus, 
these private prison corporations are not political subdivisions.  A decision by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia lends additional support to this claim.  In West Virginia ex rel. 
Youth Services Systems, Inc. v. Wilson, the court held that “a private corporation that enters into a 
contract with an agency of this State for the provision of juvenile detention services does not 
meet the definition of a ‘political subdivision’ under the [Governmental Tort Claims and 
Insurance Reform] Act.”133  Thus, the NLRA’s exemption of political subdivisions from 
statutory coverage does not prohibit incarcerated worker unionization under the Act.   
                                                          
130 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (defining “employer” as “any person acting as an agent of an employer, 
directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State or political subdivision thereof”). 
131 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971). 
132 See The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, http://www.cca.com/our-history (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016) (“Back in 1983, three enterprising leaders came together . . . .  T. Don 
Hutto, Tom Beasley and Doctor Crants were each distinguished in their own right.”) 
133 515 S.E.2d 594, 599 (W. Va. 1999).  The Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform 
Act’s definition of “political subdivision” comports with the Supreme Court’s definition of the 
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D. State Statutes and NLRA Preemption 
As explained above, state private prisons and state public prisons that host private 
corporations that use incarcerated worker labor hold many of the workers who could receive 
protection under the NLRA.  This situation implicates state laws that govern labor relations 
alongside the NLRA, some of which address the status of incarcerated workers as employees.  
For example, a Florida statute governing public-sector labor relations states that “‘[p]ublic 
employee’ means any person employed by a public employer except: . . . . (f) Those persons who 
have been convicted of a crime and are inmates confined to institutions within the state.”134  If 
the Board were to find that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA, many state 
legislatures will likely add similar language in state statutes governing private-sector labor 
relations in an attempt to limit the reach of the Board’s finding.  The ensuing conflict between 
state statutes and the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA would require a determination of 
whether the NLRA preempts these state statutes.   
A court evaluating whether the NLRA preempts state statutes that exclude incarcerated 
workers from the definition of “employee” could find that the Act preempts these statutes based 
on established precedent.  In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
obvious, actual conflict between the Act and state statutes leads to “easy judicial exclusion of 
state action.”135  If the Board found that incarcerated workers are employees under the Act, any 
state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from this definition would create obvious, actual 
                                                          
term.  See id. at 597 (“The term ‘political subdivision’ is defined . . . as: any county commission, 
municipality and county board of education; any separate corporation or instrumentality 
established by one or more counties or municipalities, as permitted by law; any instrumentality 
supported in most part by municipalities; any public body charged by law with the performance 
of a government function and whose jurisdiction is coextensive with one or more counties, cities 
or towns . . . .”) 
134 Florida Stat. Ann. § 447.203(3)(f) (2013). 
135 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955). 
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conflicts with the Act.  As such, a court could easily find that the Act preempts such state 
statutes.   
In order to further protect the primary jurisdiction of the Board to decide labor issues, the 
Supreme Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council Local 2620 v. Garmon that the 
NLRA preempts states from regulating conduct that is arguably protected by the Act.136  Under 
Garmon preemption, however, the NLRA does not preempt matters that are “deeply rooted in 
local feeling and responsibility.”137  Courts have applied this exception primarily to situations 
involving picketing, violence, or injury to the person.138  Even in instances like these, however, 
NLRA preemption can occur if the state regulation significantly affects NLRA rights or 
procedures.139   
Though the rule set out in Weber applies more directly to a Board finding that 
incarcerated workers are employees under the Act, a court could also look to Garmon to 
determine if such a finding preempts conflicting state laws.  Given that such a finding would 
allow incarcerated workers to engage in conduct protected by the Act, a court considering 
preemption under Garmon could find that the Act preempts conflicting state laws, 
notwithstanding the exception for matters deeply rooted in local feeling.  Further, though a 
state’s general power over incarcerated people in its custody is arguably a matter deeply rooted 
in local feeling and responsibility, the specific issue of whether or not these people are 
employees under statutes governing labor relations is less so.  This is especially true when 
contrasting this issue with those that typically fall under the exception—ones of violence and 
                                                          
136 See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 
LAB. L. 429, 431 (1998). 
137 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). 
138 See Befort, supra note 136 at 432. 
139 See id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 
(1978); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)).   
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injury—and when considering that state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from the 
definition of “employee” would ban conduct permitted by the NLRA.  As such, a court 
considering NLRA preemption under either Weber or Garmon could find that the Act preempts 
such state statutes.   
E. Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions in Practice 
Obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization will exist even if the Board exercises its 
jurisdiction to find that these workers are employees under the Act and a court finds that the Act 
preempts any conflicting state statutes.  Incarcerated worker unions will also face legal and 
practical obstacles as they begin to form and operate.  The first of these obstacles arises in the 
Supreme Court’s 1977 decision, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.  There, 
an incarcerated worker labor union brought suit against the North Carolina Department of 
Correction, alleging that the Department violated the union’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights when it prohibited incarcerated workers from soliciting others to join the union, barred 
meetings of the union, and refused to deliver union publications mailed in bulk to the workers for 
distribution.140  In addressing these claims, the Court first noted that lawful incarceration brings 
about a necessary withdrawal or limitation of privileges and rights, including the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue in the case.141  To determine the degree to which 
incarceration can limit these privileges and rights, the Court balanced the institutional needs and 
objectives of prisons against the rights established in the Constitution.142  The Court also granted 
wide-ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators regarding institutional 
objectives.143  In light of this deference, the Court in Jones found that the Department’s 
                                                          
140 See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977). 
141 See id. at 125. 
142 See id. at 129. 
143 See id. at 126, 128. 
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“reasonable considerations of penal management” did not “trench untowardly” on the inmates’ 
constitutional rights,144 and thus its restrictions on the union activity could stand. 
The North Carolina Department of Correction’s restrictions would certainly constitute 
violations of the NLRA.  Yet, given the outcome of Jones, prisons would likely put similar 
restrictions in place if incarcerated worker unions began to form after a Board decision finding 
that these workers are employees under the Act.  Challenges to these restrictions would then 
present courts with the task of reconciling Jones with the Board’s finding.  Courts could 
approach this task and find in favor of incarcerated worker union activity in at least two ways.  
First, a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated worker organizing would present a 
court with an opportunity to overrule Jones.  Many have argued that a court should do just this.  
In an article on the future of incarcerated worker unions after the Court’s decision in Jones, 
Regina Montoya and Paul Coggins argue that: 
The [C]ourt offered three rationales for its decisions in Jones.  First, 
the Court took the position that the judiciary should play a very 
limited role in prison litigation, and that courts should accord “wide-
ranging deference to . . . the decisions of prison administrators.  
Second, the Court expressed the view that adequate alternatives for 
prisoners’ unions existed.  Third, the Court accepted the prison 
authorities’ assertion that “the concept of a prisoners’ labor union 
was itself fraught with potential dangers” to order and security.  
Each of the three rationales underlying the Jones decision is 
erroneous.145 
 
Though the Court’s rationales in Jones may be erroneous, it is possible that a court would not 
overturn its reasoning, which is based in First and Fourteenth Amendment principles, in a case 
arising under the NLRA.   
                                                          
144 See id. at 131–32. 
145 Regina Montoya & Paul Coggins, The Future of Prisoners’ Unions: Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  799, 801–02 (1978) (citations omitted). 
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However, a court deciding a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated worker 
organizing after a Board finding that these workers are employees under the Act could take a 
second approach to prohibiting employer restrictions.  A court confronting such a case could 
distinguish Jones because its holding is based in the First and Fourteenth Amendments rather 
than the NLRA and could then decline to follow the reasoning in Jones in a case arising under 
the NLRA.  Such a decision would allow the court to avoid overturning precedent but would also 
allow it to avoid the arguably flawed reasoning in Jones.  It would also allow the court to 
acknowledge and effectuate the NLRA’s purpose—alleviating industrial strife and unequal 
bargaining power between employers and employees—a purpose that is not at issue under, and 
thus is not properly addressed by reasoning based in, First and Fourteenth Amendment 
principles.  In cases arising under the NLRA, the NLRB and courts could instead follow 
established Board law regarding employer restrictions on NLRA rights, which would be less 
restrictive of incarcerated worker unionization than the Court’s holding in Jones.   
Thus far, Part III of this Note has addressed and offered solutions to a number of legal 
obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization.  The remainder of this Part seeks to overcome a 
practical obstacle—envisioning and supporting incarcerated worker labor unions as they form.  
Though incarcerated worker labor unions may seem like unlikely or untenable organizations, 
they are not without precedent.146  Between 1971 and 1975, unions formed in prisons in 13 
states, and these unions had more than 11,000 members combined.147  In nearly every prison 
where there was a union, more than 90% of the incarcerated population wanted affiliation.148  
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The structure and demands of these unions varied from prison to prison.  In 1971, inmates at 
Green Haven Correctional Facility, outside Manhattan, organized the Prisoners’ Labor Union at 
Green Haven with the assistance of New York Legal Aid Society’s Prisoners’ Rights Project.149  
The union notified the superintendent of Green Haven that it wanted to be recognized as the 
exclusive bargaining agent for the inmates and requested a meeting for negotiations on wages, 
hours, and working conditions.150  The Ohio Prisoners’ Labor Union also formed in 1971 and set 
as its goals minimum-wage salaries and workmen’s compensation for incarcerated workers, 
correcting dangerous working conditions, and encouraging private industry to come into the 
institutions, among other things.151  Though the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Jones 
undercut the growing prisoners’ union movement in the United States,152 incarcerated worker 
unions currently operate in other countries.  In Argentina, the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores 
Privados de la Libertad Ambulatoria (“SUTPLA”), a union formed in 2012 of people 
incarcerated in a Buenos Aires prison, has 800 members and is recognized under an agreement 
with the Federal Penitentiary Service.153  Leaders of the Argentinean trade union federation to 
which SUTPLA belongs say that the International Labor Organization is closely watching 
SUTPLA because it may serve as an example for other countries to follow.154 
In addition to examples from past and present incarcerated worker unions, visions for the 
widespread operation of these unions in the United States also come from scholars.  In her article 
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on the feasibility of incarcerated worker labor unions, Susan Blankenship suggests that these 
unions’ constitutions could provide for elected leaders who frequently rotate out of their 
positions in order to provide ample leadership opportunities for those who want them and to 
reduce the potential for envy or resentment of inmates in these positions.155  Blankenship also 
envisions a non-adversarial, interest-based collective bargaining context in which the parties 
would come to the bargaining table with proposals for reaching their shared goals.156  Scholars 
also acknowledge that the unique context of incarceration may call for some limitations on the 
unions that form within it.  In his analysis of proposals for incarcerated worker labor unions, Paul 
R. Comeau notes that as in the case of public employees, incarcerated workers might be denied 
the right to strike, an outcome that institutions could justify with considerations of safety and 
order both within and outside the institution.157  Comeau also suggests that institutions could 
limit the size of the audience to a union gathering or the location or time of such a gathering.158  
Further, though incarcerated worker unions could call attention to and seek to address prison 
conditions generally, the NLRA would only require employers to bargain with unions over 
wages, hours, and working conditions.     
In addition to envisioning how incarcerated worker unions could operate, scholars, as 
well as courts,159 have acknowledged the potential benefits of these unions.  In an article on the 
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causes of and ways to avoid prison riots, Vernon Fox argues that “[s]ome type of inmate self-
government that involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to 
discuss problems, make recommendations, and perhaps, even take some responsibilities from the 
administration could be helpful.”160  In an article on the need for restructuring of the prison 
economic system, Sarah M. Singleton notes that incarcerated workers receiving equitable 
payment for work performed could be able to provide support for their family, continue 
payments on social security, provide restitution if applicable to their case, and save money to 
assist themselves upon their release from prison.161  Similarly, Comeau notes that incarcerated 
worker unions that offer power to inmates and that are designed to eliminate abuses in prisons 
could be useful tools for the “genuine rehabilitation” of incarcerated individuals.162  Indeed, 
Comeau argues: 
In the general labor force, employer acceptance of and cooperation 
with labor organization has resulted in a reduction of union 
militancy and the stabilization of industrial relations.  If the 
formation of unions within correctional facilities would have this 
effect, it is possible that administrators would have legal and social 
responsibility to allow unionization.163 
 
Conclusion 
In an article on the intersection between law and prisons, Jonathan A. Willens writes: 
The decision in Jones . . . presented the substance of imprisonment, 
what the prison will be, and the Court refused to look. . . . [E]ven 
while refusing to look at the substance of imprisonment, the Court 
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legitimates a particular substance by imposing and enforcing its 
legal structure.  Because this legal structure rests on a particular 
conception of what prison is, the law creates a prison that 
increasingly reflects this conception.164 
 
In this way, courts and the law build prisons.  In this way too, the Board, courts, and the public 
currently have an opportunity to reshape the prisons that they have built.  The Board’s decision 
in Columbia University creates an opening for finding that incarcerated workers are employees 
under the NLRA and are thus able to form unions protected by the Act.  Though a number of 
obstacles will likely arise on the path to incarcerated worker unionization, this Note offers 
solutions to these obstacles and argues that given the ways in which prison labor is a form of 
modern-day slavery, the Board and courts should take up these solutions.   
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